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Entry Deterrence: A Cournot Model * 
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1. Introduction 
Can established firms strategically advertise to impede entry? This question has been 
long analyzed since Bain [1956] argued that product differentiation via advertising serves 
as an entry barrier. Recent developments in game theory have enabled economists to 
rigorously investigate this question l ). Schmalensee [1983] was the first to examine whether 
an incumbent can prevent entry by engaging in informative advertising. Advertisements by 
a firm inform consumers of the existence of its brand and how to quote the price. 
Consumers can know the existence of brands only through their exposure to 
advertisements. The incumbent advertises before the entrant. Having observed the 
incumbent's advertising level, the entrant sets its advertising level. Finally, the firms 
simultaneously announce a quantity conditional on the firms' advertising levels. Under this 
setting, he claimed that the quantity-setting subgame always has pure-strategy Cournot-
Nash equilibria. Then, he showed that the incumbent can optimally advertise less than if 
the threat of entry is absent to deter new entry. 
This article reexamines Schmalensee's [1983] strategic entry-deterrence game. I first 
show that his characterization of the post-advertising Cournot equilibria is incorrect. Unlike 
his claim, the post-advertising Cournot-Nash equilibria can be in mixed strategies when the 
number of consumers knowing only one brand is relatively greater than that of consumers 
knowing only the other brand2). Then, based on the correct characterization of the post-
advertising Cournot-Nash equilibria, I reconsider if the incumbent can deter entry via 
advertising in his game. At the sequential-move advertising stage, the entrant's profit 
initially declines with the incumbent's advertising investment. After attaining a minimum, 
it rises with the incumbent's advertising investment, but never exceeds the incumbent's 
* This article is a revision of part of Essay 1 of my Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Purdue University in 
December, 1998. I wish to thank my supervisors Dan Kovenock and William Novhsek for 
encouragement and suggestion. My dissertation research was made possible through a grant from 
Purdue Research Foundation. 
1) See Fudenberg and Tirole [1984], Baldani and Masson [1984], and Bonnano [1986]. 
2) This finding interestingly contrasts the Nash equilibria in the price-setting duopolies under similar 
demand conditions. Narasimhan [1988], Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee [1992], Ireland [1993], and 
Golding and Slutsky [undated] show that the Bertrand-Nash equilibria are always in mixed strategies. 
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monopoly profit. Thus, under certain conditions of the levels of sunk, fixed advertising 
cost, the incumbent can find an advertising level less than its monopoly advertising level 
(1) to make the entrant's overall profit zero (if entry occurs), and (2) to earn more than 
when entry is accommodated. That is, the incumbent can deter entry by advertising less 
than if the threat of entry is absent. This is what he showed on the basis of his incorrect 
characterization of the post-advertising equilibrium. Hence, this paper demonstrates that 
even if Schmalensee's [1983] analysis of the post-advertising quantity competition is 
incorrect, his finding regarding strategic entry deterrence via advertising by the incumbent 
is qualitatively correct. 
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the structure of the 
model considered. Section 3 characterizes the Nash equilibrium of the post-advertising 
game. Section 4 examines the incumbent's strategic advertising to influence the entrant's 
entry decision. In Section 5, I conclude this article. 
2. The Model 
The basic structure of the model follows Schmalensee [1983] except that the variable 
cost function of advertising is quadratic. Formally, I examine the following three-stage 
game: at stage 1, an incumbent decides whether to enter a market, and if it does, it engages 
in advertising with sunk fixed and variable costs; at stage 2, an entrant chooses whether to 
enter the market, and if it does, it advertises with sunk fixed and variable costs; and finally 
at stage 3, the firms compete in prices (in Section 4) or quantities (in Section 5). The 
extensive form of this game is shown in Figure 1. My analysis focuses on subgame perfect 
equilibria. 
Following the Schmalensee's notation, I assume that firm X is the incumbent and Y is 
the potential entrant. They produce a homogeneous product if they produce anything. The 
marginal cost of production, is a positive constant and less than 1 for both firms. There is 
a continuum of potential consumers. The total mass of these consumers is normalized to 
unity. Their common utility function is defined by 
(1) 
where qo is the numeraire, qi is the quantity demanded for brand i and Pi is brand i's 
market price. The consumers are price takers and maximize the utility not only subject to a 
budget constraint, qo + Piqi < m where m is a sufficiently large income in terms of the 
numeraire but also subject to their exposure to advertisements by the firms. 
In order to make any sales, firms X and Y must invest a fixed amount, f, to design and 
prepare to print leaflets. This cost is forever sunk. Firms, then, print leaflets and send them 
at random to consumers. Before receiving the leaflets, consumers are assumed not to know 
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the existence of either of brands. Receiving one or more leaflets from a firm, a consumer 
knows the existence and the attribute of its brand and the telephone number and the 
location of the firm, namely, how to quote its price. 
Advertising here creates a segmentation of the consumers. Suppose firm X has informed 
o ~ x ~ 1 (fraction of) consumers of the existence of brand X, and firm Y has informed 0 ~ 
y ~ 1 consumers of the existence of brand Y. Then, x( 1 - y) consumers know the existence 
of only brand X; y( 1 - x) consumers know the existence of only brand Y; xy consumers 
know the existence of brands X and Y; and (1 - x)(l - y) consumers know neither of the 
brands. The perfectly informed consumers can compare the prices set by both the firms. 
They each purchase qx = 1 - px, px E [0,1] , units of brand X and nothing from firm Y 
if brand X's price is less than brand Y's; otherwise buy qy = 1 - py, py E [0,1] , units 
of brand Y and nothing from firm X. On the other hand, the asymmetrically informed 
consumers are insensitive to the price differences because they know the existence of only 
one of the brands. Thus, those who know only brand X (Y) have a demand 
function, qx = 1 - px, px E [0,1] (qy = 1 - py, py E [0,1]), which is obtained from 
the utility maximization subject to the budget constraint. They are virtually monopolized 
by either of the firms. 
It would be worth mentioning that the properties of purchasing behavior of the perfectly 
and imperfectly informed consumers are, respectively, parallel to those of switchers and 
brand-loyal consumers. Narasimhan [1988], and Deneckere, Kovenock and Lee [1992] 
among others have analyzed the situation in which the population sizes of these consumers 
are exogenous. Therefore, this model is considered as a generalization of these models by 
endogenizing the population sizes of brand-loyal consumers and switchers. 
As to variable cost of advertising, following Tirole [1988], I will employ a quadratic 
function, 
e(z) = (a/2)z2, a > 0, (2) 
where z = x or y and is a positive parameter. As I will show later, the model prediction 
does not depend on the specific form of the cost function of advertising as long as the 
marginal cost of advertising increases at a relatively lower rate. Thus, I will confine my 
analysis to the case where variable cost of advertising follows this quadratic function. 
3. Post-advertising Cournot Equilibrium 
In this section, I re-characterize the Cournot-Nash equilibria in the post-advertising game 
to disprove Schmalensee's [1983] claim that all the Cournot-Nash equilibria are in pure 
strategies. I first identify the profit function to derive the quantity best-response 
correspondences, given that the levels of advertising are fixed. Then, with those best-
response correspondences, I fully characterize the Cournot-Nash equilibria. 
Suppose that the firms are about to decide a level of output after they have already 
advertised. Those firms face the following market conditions (Schmalensee [1983] pp. 640-
641, especially footnote 8): (a) there is a separate Cournot market for each brand; (b) each 
firm indirectly controls the market price by changing its production level; and (c) the 
perfectly informed consumers compare the market prices. Under this situation, firm X's 
profit function must be 
if 0 < 1 - qx < 1 - qy 
x - y(1 - x) 
'lrx(qX, qy I x, y) = [1 
qx + qy 1 { 1 -- gx > 1 - gy > 0 
- c - qx if x - y(l-x) (3) 
x + y - xy 1 - SlY > 1 - gx > 0 
y - x(l-y) 
[1 - c - qx 1 qx x(l - y) if 0 < 1 - qy < 1 _ qx y - x(l - y) 
The meaning of the top and bottom sub-profit functions would be straightforward. Firm X 
earns a profit through the top sub-profit function when it produces a quantity large enough 
to undercut firm Y, and sells to all the perfectly informed consumers as well as firm X's 
captive consumers. The bottom one arises in the opposite situation where firm X meets the 
demand of only its captive consumers by limiting its output level so that brand X's market 
price is higher than brand Y's. 
The middle sub-profit function arises when the following two conditions hold at the 
same time: (a) if all the perfectly informed consumers buy from firm X, brand X's price is 
larger than brand Y's, and (b) if all the perfectly informed consumers buy from firm Y, 
brand Y's price is larger than brand X's. In such a situation, the perfectly informed 
consumers must play an arbitrage role to equalize the market prices. Hence, 1-qx/[x{1-
y)+kxy] = 1-qy/[y(1-x)+(1-k)xy], or k = [qx/(qX + qy)]/x - {1 - y)[qy/(qX 
+ qy))/y is an endogenous variable. Substituting k into {I - c - qx/[x(l - y) + kxy] 
}qX yields the middle sub-profit function above. In this situation, the firms determine an 
output level as if all the products were sold in a single Cournot market. 
Now I will derive the quantity best-response correspondences. Without loss of generality, 
I focus on the derivation of firm X's quantity best-response correspondence. Under the 
parameter restriction of x > (yfy - y)/(2 + yfy - y) ,3) fiml X's profit function is given 
in Figure 2a. When firm Y's quantity is less than q~:= y(1 - x)(1 - c)/2 , firm X's 
typical profit function is ABDEFG. The q~ is determined by the condition that the 
3) The meaning of this inequality restriction is explained later. 
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quantity level at which firm X's profit function changes from the middle to the top in (3) re 
aches the maximizer of the top sub-profit function in (3). At points Band D, firm X's profit 
function changes from the bottom to the middle, and from the middle to the top in (3), resp 
ectively. The best-response is q~* := x(l - c)/2 ,which is the maximizer of firm X's mo 
nopoly profit when firm X sells to all the consumers who know brand X. When 
q~ :::; qy :::; q~ := (x+y-xy)(1-x)y(1-c)/(2x+Y-xy), firm X's typical profit functi 
on becomes ACEFG. The q~ is determined by the condition that the quantity level at whic 
h firm X's profit function changes from the middle to the top in (3) coincides with the maxi 
mizer of the middle sub-profit function. The best response is q~*** := qyX 
/[y(l - x)J. Notice that then it is indifferent to firm X whether firm X is a monopolist selli 
ng to all the consumers who know its brand, or firm X competes with firm Y as if both pro 
ducts were traded in a single Cournot market. When q~ :::; qy < q'.!j := [x+y-xy 
-Jx + y - xyJx(l - y)](l-c), firm X's typical profit function is AHFG. The q'.!j is firm 
Y's quantity level where the maximum of the middle sub-profit function is equivalent to 
that of the bottom sub-profit function in (3). The best-response is q~** = [(1 - c) 
(x + y - xy) - qy]/2. This is exactly the conventional Cournot best response. When 
q'.!j :::; qy firm X's profit function is AHUG. The best response is q~ = x(l - y)(l - c) /2. 
Summarizing the findings above, I have firm X's quantity best-response correspondence: 
x(l - c)/2 
xqy /[y(l - x)] 
[(1 - c)(x + y - xy) - qy]/2 
x(l - y)(1- c)/2 
if 0 < qy :::; q~ 
if q' < q < q" y - y - y 
if q" < q < q'" y - y - y 
if q'" < q y - yy 
(4) 
Firm Y's quantity best-response correspondence can be obtained from the above with 
arguments transposed. 
In the above, with the inequality condition, I considered the situation where firm X's 
best-response can be q~*~ But, if the opposite inequality condition, x :::; (VY - y) / (2 
+ VY - y), holds, firm X's best response changes from q~*** to q~. The situation is 
shown in Figure 2b. Firm X chooses the same best responses as in the above until firm Y's 
quantity reaches <IY : = x( 1 - y) (1 + VX) (1 - c) /2 . This critical value is determined by 
the condition that firm X's profit when firm X's produces is equal to the maximum of the 
bottom sub-profit function in (3). When firm Y's quantity is beyond <IY firm X's optimal 
quantity is q~. Thus, if x < (VY - y)/(2 + VY - y) holds, firm X's quantity best-
response correspondence is 
{ 
x(l - c)/2 
qx(qy I x,y) = xqy/[y(l- x)] 
x(l - y)(l - c)/2 
if 0 <qy < q~ 
if q~ < qy < qy. 
if qy < qy 
(5) 
Firm Y also has the equivalent best-response correspondence under the corresponding 
inequality condition. 
These quantity best-response correspondences essentially imply that when firm j's output 
level is relatively low, firm i is better off by undercutting through greater production, and 
selling to all the consumers who know brand i. On the other hand, if firm j's output level is 
relatively great, firm i benefits from restricting its quantity to a lower level and selling to 
the consumers who know only brand i. Each firm never produces less than when it sells to 
the consumers who know only its product at the monopoly price. The presence of the 
second type of best response from the top in (4) and (5) suggests that quantities can be 
locally strategic complements unlike in the conventional Cournot model under the 
assumption that consumers know the existence of all homogeneous products. 
With the quantity best-response correspondences, I can derive the Cournot-Nash 
equilibria of this game. Since the combination of x and y determines the quantity best-
response correspondences, the type of Cournot-Nash equilibrium is totally identified by the 
location of (x, y) in the advertising strategy space. Figure 3a shows the map of the regions 
of (x, y) space in each of which the same (or similar) type of Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
emerges. Let me first present the equilibrium of each case4). 
Proposition 1: (Post-advertising Cournot-Nash Equilibrium). 
The post-advertising simultaneous-move quantity-setting game has the following 
Cournot-Nash equilibrium. 
1. When (x, y) lies in Region A (of Figure 3a), the game has a pure-strategy Coumot-Nash 
equilibrium where the two firms produce an identical quantity (See Figure 4a). Firm i's 
profit is 
IIi = (x + y - xy)(l - c? /9, i = X, Y. (6) 
2. When (x, y) lies in Region B, the game has a mixed-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
where each firm randomizes two quantities (See Figures 4b and 4c). Firms X and Yearn 
4) I will later discuss the Cournot-Nash equilibria when x and yare in Region F. 
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TIx = x(l - y)(l - c)2/4, (7) 
TI
* - (1-c)2y(2x+3y-2xy) 
y - ({ 2n -1 } ) , 16 :;+1_1 x(l-y)+y 
(8) 
respectively, where n = 0, 1, 2, 3, ... and so on, and the "0" corresponds to the case 
of q~(qx(y(l - c)/2)) 2: q':j the "I" corresponds to the case of q~(qx(q~(qx(y(l-c) 
/2)))) 2: q':) 2: q~(qx(y(1-c)/2)) and so on. Symmetric profits can be obtained when , 
x and y are in Region E. 
3. When (x, y) lies in Region C, the game has a mixed-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium 
where both firms randomize two quantities (See Figures 4d and 4e). Firms X and Yearn 
m = x(l- y)(l- c)2/4,fIv = Y {1- Cx(: _ y))2} (1- c?/4, (9) 
respectively. Symmetric profits can be obtained when x and yare in Region D. 
The proof of the equilibrium in each situation is its explicit derivation. Nevertheless, I 
will provide only a sketch of the detailed process of the derivation of each equilibrium 
since the derivation is not difficult but rather messy, and the procedure is in principle the 
same among all the cases. The method used to find the equilibrium is as follows. First, one 
identifies the firms' pure strategies that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated 
strategies. Let firm i's set of the survived strategies be Sx,i = X, Y. Then, one needs to 
check if every possible combination of the quantities in Sx and Sy can constitute an 
mixed-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. One can prove that the mixed strategies 
under one combination constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium by showing that the 
following two conditions are satisfied. (a) All the mixed-strategy equilibrium probabilities 
assigned to the quantities in the combination are non-negative. (b) Firm i has no incentive 
to produce different outputs in from the ones in the combination, given that firm j's 
(randomized) strategy of the quantities of Sf in the combination is fixed (i, j = X, Y; i ;t:. j). 
For the sake of explanation, I often refer to the symbols in Figure 4a of the quantity best-
response correspondences. 
First of all, I will prove the equilibrium when x and y lie in Region A of Figure 3a. A 
typical pair of the quantity best-response correspondences is shown in Figure 4a. The 
values of x and y of Region A are restricted by the condition that the two quantity best-
response correspondences have a unique intersection at qf = (x + y - xy)(l - c)/3, i 
= X, Y. That is, q~' S; qf, qt(qj") S; qf, qf S; qt(qj') , and qf S; q~", or 5x/(5x + 4) 
S; y S; 4x/(5 - 5x). In this case, each Sj is a singleton, or contains only (x + y - xy)(1 -
c)/3. Thus, when x and yare in Region A, the post-advertising game has the "conventional" 
pure-strategy Cournot equilibrium as if all the products were sold in a single market. The 
profits can be obtained by following the routine calculation. 
Let me next prove the equilibria when x and yare in Region B (and Region E). The 
condition qx(q~) 2: q~ or 5x/(5x + 4) > y implies that in Figure 4a, the line segment 
11 is below the line segment CD. The condition y S; 2x2/(1 - 2x)(1 - x) implies that in 
Figure 4a, qx(y(l - c)/2) is the traditional Cournot type best response, or the line AB 
meets the line segment 11. The condition of x(Vl7 -1- 4x)/[2{2 - x(l + 2x)}] S; y 
means that qy(qx(y(l - c)/2)) is the traditional Coumot type best response. The condition 
of y S; 2x(2x - 1 + 2V4x2 - 6x + 2)/(12x2 - 20x + 7) ensures that qx(y(l - c)/2) is 
Iff 
smaller then qx . 
Given these conditions, suppose additionally q~(qx(y(1-c)/2)) 2: q'-:) (or y S; 2x(14x 
-1-4y'Ti)/(28x2-4x-25)) holds (n = 0 in Proposition 1). A typical pair of the quantity 
best-response correspondences is shown in Figure 4b. Apparently, the game with those 
parameter values has no pure-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibrium. By deleting strictly 
dominated strategies sequentially, one can find that Sx = {x(l - y)(1- c)/2, qx(y(l 
- c)/2) = (2x + y - 2xy)(1 - c)/4}, and Sy = {y(l - c)/2, qy(qx(y(l - c)/2)) = 
(2x + 3y - 2xy)(1 - c)/8}. An important observation here is that in the reduced game, 
since firm Y always produces more than y(l - c)/2 , firm X can always earn 
x(1 - y)(l - C)2 /4 by setting x(l - y)(l - c)/2. Because of this, firm X's expected 
profit in the mixed-strategy equilibrium must be x( 1 - y) (1 - c)2 /4. Firm Y's expected 
profit can be obtained by explicit calculation: (1 - c )2y (2x + 3y - 2xy) /8(x + 2y - xy) . 
Suppose now that the condition qy(qx(qy(qx(y(1-c)/2)))) > q~ > qy(qx(y(1-c)/ 
2)) comes to hold (n = I in Proposition 1). This condition implies that the point of I is 
much closer to the line segment CD than in Figure 4b. A typical pair of the quantity best-
response correspondences is given in Figure 4c. As shown in the figure, the number of the 
elements of SF is now three: Sx = {x(l - y)(l - c)/2, qx(qy(qx(y(1 - c)/2))), qx 
(y(l - c)/2)}, and S~ = {y(l - c)/2, q~(qx(y(l- c)/2)), qy(qx(qy(qx(y(l - c) 
/2))) n· A useful observation is that, as seen in the above, firm X can always earn 
x(1 - y)(l - c)2/4 by setting x(l - y)(l - c)/2 since firm Y is always expected to 
produce more than y(1 - c)/2 . Thus, one can see that there is no mixed-strategy 
equilibrium where the firms use all three quantities survived iterated strict dominance. This 
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is because there is no combination of the probabilities assigned to firm Y's three quantities 
so that firm X earns the same profit by producing the second quantity as by producing the 
third quantity. With careful examination of the non-negativity condition of the probabilities 
assigned to the strategies and the Nash condition of the strategies, one can show that the 
carrier of firm X's mixed-strategy equilibrium probability function is composed of 
x(l- y)(l - c)/2, and qx(qy(qx(y(l- c)/2))) ; and that of firm Y's contains 
y(l - c)/2 and qy(qx(y(l- c)/2))). In the equilibrium, firm X's expected profit is 
x(l - y)(l - c)2/4 , firm Y's expected profit is (1 - c)2y(2x + 3y - 2xy)/16{(2/5)x 
(1 - y) + y}. 
When the point of I becomes again much closer to the line segment CD, qy(qx(qy(qx 
(qy(qx(y(l - c)/2)))))) ~ q~ ~ qy(qx(qy(qx(qy(y(l - c)/2)))) may hold (n = 2 in 
Proposition 1). Under this condition, SF , i = x, Y, now contains four elements. But, by 
using a similar logic to the above, one can show that in the mixed-strategy equilibrium, 
firm X uses two quantities, x(1-y)(1-c)/2, and qx(qy(qx(qy(qx(y(1-c)/2)) firm 
, 
Y uses two quantities, y(l - c)/2 and qy(qx(y(l - c)/2))). Firm X's equilibrium 
profit is, as above, x(l - y)(l - c)2/4 , but firm Y's equilibrium expected profit 
becomes (1 - c)2y(2x + 3y - 2xy)/16{(32/85)x(1 - y) + y} . 
Observing the changes in the firms' carriers of the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
probability functions from one case to another in the above, one can see that (a) firm X 
always chooses two quantities from Sx so that the average of the two quantities is smaller 
than that of any other two quantities in Sx and that (b) firm Y chooses the same two 
quantities. This finding makes it easy to identify the carriers of the firms' mixed-strategy 
equilibrium probability functions and to calculate firm Y's profit for n = 3, 4, ... , and so on. 
The general formula of firm Y's expected profit in Proposition 1 can be obtained from 
those profits of firm Y's by mathematical induction. 
Now I turn to the derivation of the equilibrium when x and yare in Region C (also 
Region D). As in Region B, the parameter values are restricted by the condition qx (q~ ) 
> q~ or 5x/(5x + 4) > y (the line segment IJ is below the line segment CD in Figure 
4a); the condition y < 2x2/(1 - 2x)(1 - x) (the line AB meets the line segment IJ in 
Figure 4a). But, the condition of y :::; x( /i7 - 4x - 1) /[2{2 - x(2x + I)}] means that 
firm Y's best-response to qx (y(l - c) /2) is on the line segment BC in Figure 4a. A typical 
pair of the quantity best-response correspondences of such a case is given in Figures 4d and 
4e when both firms' quantity best-response correspondences are the type of (4), and firm 
X's is the type of (4) but firm Y's is the type of (5), respectively. Given these conditions, 
one can show that Sx = {x(l - y)(l - c)/2, qx(y(l - c)/2) = (2x + y - 2xy)(1 - c) 
/4}, and Sy = {y(l - c)/2, qy(qx(y(l - c)/2)) = y(2x + y - 2xy)(1 - c)/[4x(1 -
y)]}. This case is equivalent in spirit to the situation when n = 0 in Region B. Likewise, 
one can obtain the expected profits shown in Proposition 1. This completes the proof of 
Proposition 1. 
Region F can be partitioned into small regions (RI, R2, ... , RI2, and the blanked region 
around the origin) in which Sihas different elements. The partition is shown in Figure 5. 
Table I has the list of the critical mathematical conditions of R I, R2, ... , RIO to determine 
the levels and the number of the elements of Si. A pair of quantity best-response 
correspondences for each of RI, R2, ... , RIO is given in Figures 6a-j. Each of Figures 6a-j 
indicates the quantities that survive iterated strict dominance by black dots. 
By carefully examining the conditions (2) of all the cases in Table 1, one would notice 
the following invariant rule on the number of the elements of SfC!: 
1. Under the condition that qt(or <Ii) < qi(··· qk(qh(k(l - c)/2)) ... ) and qj"(or <li) 
< qj( ... qh(qk(h(l - c)/2)) ... ) (i,j, k, h = X, Y or x, y; i #- j; k #- h) where each 
initial value is alternately nested n times by the quantity best-response correspondences: 
(I) If i = k and j = h, the n must be a positive even number, and the firms have n + I 
strategies in Si(e.g., R5, R6, (R6') and R7; n = 2); 
(2) If i = hand j = k, the n must be a positive odd number, and the firms have 2n - I 
strategies in Si(e.g., Rl, R2, (R2'), and R3; n = 1: R9, n = 3). 
2. Under the condition that qt(or <Ii) < qi(··· qk(qh(k(l - c)/2)) ... ) but qj"(or <li) 
> qj ( ... qh ( qk (h( 1 - c) /2)) ... ) (i, j, k, h = X, Y or x, y; i i- j; k #- h) where each initial 
value is alternately nested n times by the two quantity best-response correspondences: 
(I) If i = k and j = h, the n must be a positive even number, and the firms have (n/2) + I 
strategies in Si(e.g., R4 (R4') and R8 (R8'); n = 2); 
(2) If i = hand j = k, n, n ~ 3, must be a positive odd number, and the firms have [en + 
1)/2] + I strategies in Si(e.g., RIO (RIO'); n = 3). 
By using these formulas (and the corresponding condition (l )), one can partition the 
un shaded region around the origin in Figure I O. As one can expect from Figure 5 and this 
rule, the partition of the region becomes finer as (x, y) approaches to the origin. 
Figures 7a and 7b show that different mixed-strategy equilibrium can arise for the 
same Sifor i = X, Y in RI, R2, ... , R8 of Region F5). The division of each RI, R2, ... , R8 
is determined by the non-negativity conditions of the probabilities assigned to the 
quantities chosen in the equilibria and the optimal condition of the equilibrium strategies. 
I indicate which elements of Si constitute the carriers of the mixed-strategy equilibrium 
probability functions below Figures 7 a and 7b by using the numbers assigned to the 
quantities of Si graphically shown in Figures 6a-h. Note that as in the case of Region B, 
not all the survived strategies are always used in the mixed-strategy equilibrium. With 
those quantities, one can easily obtain the mixed-strategy probability functions and the 
expected profits. By assuming that the marginal cost of advertising does not increase at a 
5) Clearly, this is true of the other parts of Region F than R1, R2, ... , R8. 
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very fast rate, my analysis of the advertising stage in the next subsection focuses on the 
situation where x and yare out of Region F. Thus, I do not go too far into the 
characterization of each mixed-strategy advertising subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
when x and yare in Region F. 
Finally, I would like to conclude this subsection by discussing Schmalensee's [1983] 
characterization of the Cournot-Nash equilibria of the post-advertising game. In his 
characterization of the Cournot-Nash equilibria, he presumed that the presence of the 
perfectly informed consumers always leads to the equalization of the two Coumot market 
prices. Based on this, he claimed that there are two kinds of Cournot-Nash equilibria of the 
post-advertising subgame: (l) when Y 1 (1 + y) :::; x :::; y 1 (1 - y) or "at least half the 
informed buyers must know of X and at least half must know of Y" (Schmalensee [1983] 
p. 641); both firms sell to the perfectly informed consumers in addition to their own captive 
consumers by producing a quantity, (x + y - xy) (1 - c) 13 as if both products were sold 
in a single Cournot market; and (2) when y 1(1 - y) < x :::; 1(0 :::; x < y 1(1 - y)), firm 
X (Y) sells to the consumers knowing only brand X (Y), firm Y (X) sells to all the 
consumers who know brand Y (X), and because of the presence of the perfectly informed 
consumers, the products are sold at the same price: Px = 1-qx/[x(1-y)] = py = 1-qy 
Iy (px = 1-Qx/x = py = 1-Qy l[y(l-x)]). 
Apparently, my characterization has disproved his claim. In particular, the examination in 
this section has shown that his presumption about the role of the perfectly informed 
consumers on the market prices is incorrect. That is, the arbitrage role played by the 
perfectly informed buyers is not sufficient for the market price equalization in equilibrium. 
In any mixed-strategy equilibrium, the market price of brand X can be different from that 
of brand Y with a positive probability. The market prices of the two brands are always 
equal only when the equilibrium is in pure strategies. 
4. Advertising Equilibrium and Entry Decisions 
In this section, I examine the possibility of strategic entry deterrence via strategic 
precommitment to advertising investment by the incumbent. My analysis of the advertising 
stage is confined to the situation in which firms optimally choose relatively larger levels of 
advertising under the assumption that the marginal cost of advertising increases steadily 
(the exact condition follows later). In other words, I exclude the possibility that the firms 
compete at the quantity-setting stage given that x and yare in Region F of Figure 3a. In this 
sense, I must admit the conclusion of my analysis is not completely general. The firms' 
profit functions at the advertising stage have many discontinuities in Region F since small 
changes in advertising levels abruptly replace the elements of Sj, and the mixed-strategy 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria (See Figures 7a and 7b). This makes the exact 
examination of strategic entry deterrence intolerably complicated when x and yare in 
Region F. 
I start the analysis with the derivation of the advertising best-response correspondences. 
For the sake of the convenience of explanation, without loss of generality, I will focus on 
the derivation of firm X's advertising best-response correspondence given that firm Y's 
advertising level is fixed. Using the results of Proposition 1, I can obtain firm X's (re-
scaled) profit function at the advertising stage (Here, I have already ruled out the 




4(x + y - xy) A 2 
------------ - -x 
9 2 
if (x, y) E Regions B & C 
if (x, y) E Regions A 
Vx(x,y) = A 2 
r(x, y, n) - 2x 
(10) 
if (x, y) E Regions E 
x { 1 [ x ]2 } A x2 if (x, y) E Regions D 
- 2y(1 - x) - 2 
where 
( ) _ x(2y+3x-2xy) . (11) r n, x, y - ({ 3 22 1} ) , 4 4~+~=1 y(l - x) + x 
n is defined in the same way as in Proposition 1. As to handling the profit of (11), when n 
is larger than or equal to 4, I will assume that firm X's profit is limn-tCXJ r(n, x, y). This 
simplification can be justified because, when n is beyond 4, firm Y's profit is very close to 
its limit, and the set of x and y with n ~ 4 is very thin (See Figure 3b). In particular, observe 
that (3.22.4-3)/(44+1 -1) = 128/341 = 0.375367, and limn-tCXJ[(3· 22n-1)/(4n+1 
- 1)] = 3/8 = 0.375. Thus, this approximation should not change the qualitative 
prediction of this model- which will be explicitly shown later. To avoid the firms choosing 
x and y in Region F, I assume that 1 < A < 1.57618. I have verified that when A is smaller 
than this upper bound, firm X never chooses x so that x and yare in Region F 6). 
6) The upper boundary of A is determined by the condition that when y = 0.265278, firm X's best-
response changes from (1 - y)/A to 5y/(5y +4), the boundary between Region A and Region E. 
The exact process to ensure that given y, firm X never chooses x so that x and yare in Region F is 
as follows. First I assumed that when x and yare in Region F, firm X earns the monopoly profit by 
selling to all the consumers who know brand X. Notice that firm X never earns more than this 
monopoly profit in any mixed-strategy equilibrium arising in Region F, and the monopoly profit is fairly 
low when x is low. Then, I made Mathematica programs to generate the figures of firm X's profit 
functions for 0 $ Y $ 0.1459,0.1459 $ Y $ 0.1798,0.1798 $ Y $ 0.1910,0.1910 $ Y $ 0.2,0.2 $ Y $ 
0.2490, 0.2490 $ Y $ 0.2616, 0.2616 $ Y $ 0.2644, 0.2644 $ Y $ 0.2652, and 0.265224 $ Y $ 
0.265278. The intervals are determined by considering the discontinuous change in firm X's profit 
function. Then, I ensured that (, y) is out of Region F under the restriction of the value of A. 
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Figure 8a and 8b have firm X' s advertising profit functions with A being 12/11 when x is 
0.3, 0.8, respectively. Figure 8a shows that when y is relatively low, firm X optimally 
chooses a relatively large x to earn the (re-scaled) advertising revenue 
x(l - y) : x* = (1 - y)/ A. In the case of Figure 8b, firm X's best response is a boundary 
value between Region E and Region A, 5y/(5y + 4) (See Figure 8cf). These two figures 
indicate a certain critical value of y, y at which firm X changes the type of its best-response 
advertising levels. The critical value can be identified by the condition 
{ 
x( 2y + 3x - 2xy) A 2} 
4{(3/8)y(1 - x) + x} - 2 X x=2L-
5y+4 
When A = 12111, y= 0.322381. 
(1 - y)2 
2A 
(12) 
From what I have shown, it is easy to derive the advertising best-response 
correspondences. A pair of the advertising best-response correspondences when A = 12/11 
is shown in Figure 9. The shape of the advertising best-response correspondence can be 
shown to be similar for 1 < A < 1.57618. An immediate observation is that the 
simultaneous-move advertising subgame has no advertising subgame perfect equilibrium in 
pure strategies, but in mixed strategies8). The shape of the advertising best-response 
correspondences suggests that the firms' advertising levels are neither globally strategic 
complements nor strategic substitutes. 
With the advertising best-response correspondences, I can now examine the possibility of 
strategic entry deterrence. Figure lOa has firm X's and Y's profit functions, 
Vx(x, y*(x)), and the monopoly profit, Vx(x) = x - Ax2/2 with A = 12/11. As seen 
from the figure, when F is larger than Vx (xID ) even the incumbent does not enter the market 
, 
since no firm earns more than the monopoly profit. When Vy (Xli, y* (Xli)) < F < Vx (Xli), 
entry is blockaded since when firm X simply advertises as a monopolist, firm Y cannot 
earn an overall positive profit by entry. When Vy(x,y*(x)) < F < Vy (xID,Y*(XID )), 
firm X can find xb to make firm Y's overall profit zero where x < xb < xID satisfies 
Vy(xb , y*(xb )) = F, and Vx(xb ) > VX (XS, y*(XS)) and Vx (xb ) > F. Thus, firm Y 
stays out of the market; entry is effectively impeded. This shows that the optimal entry 
deterrence of this game actually involves underinvestment in advertising by the incumbent, 
as Schmalensee [1983] originally claimed on the base of the incorrect characterization of 
7) Significantly, this result shows that the above approximation of firm V's equilibrium profits does not 
change the overall implication of this model. 
8) The same observation has been made by Schmalensee [1983]. In fact, he also derived similar 
advertising best-response correspondences based on his characterization of the post-advertising 
Cournot equilibria (Schmalensee 1983, p. 645). 
the post-advertising Cournot equilibria. When a < F < Vy(x, y* (x)), firm X has no 
strategies to make firm Y's overall profit non-negative, and sets xS in anticipation of firm 
Y's entry. Thus, firm Y can profitably enter the market; entry is easy (See Figure lab). It 
can be shown that qualitatively similar outcome above can hold for all I < A < 1.57618; in 
particular, strategic entry deterrence is possible, and always involves strategic 
precommitment to underinvestment in advertising by the incumbent. 
As a summary of what I have shown in this subsection, I establish the following 
proposition. 
Proposition 2: (Subgame Perfect Entry Equilibrium). 
In the game where, at stage 1, a firm (incumbent) decides whether to enter a market and a 
level of informative advertising; at stage 2, a firm (entrant) decides whether to enter the 
market and a level of informative advertising; and at stage 3, the two firms compete in 
quantities; the incumbent may strategically deter entry through underinvestment in 
advertising. Nevertheless, when the sunk fixed cost of advertising is relatively larger, entry 
may be blockaded. Besides, if the sunk fixed cost of advertising is relatively smaller, the 
incumbent may profitably enter the market. 
The robustness of this proposition should be discussed before I end this section. First of 
all, I must refer to what would happen if the marginal advertising cost is relatively high, 
namely, A = 2, 3, 4, and so on. If A takes such a value, firm Y's advertising best-response 
correspondence may have a discontinuity that (x, y* (x)) jumps from Region D into Region 
F. But, it would be true that V y (xm , y* (xm)) is smaller than VX- (xm) and V y (x, ym (x) ) 
increases with x in the neighborhood of xm. This indicates that even if A is large and the 
firms select x and y in Region F, strategic entry deterrence via advertising would involve 
underinvestment in advertising by the incumbent. Second, the choice of the quadratic 
advertising cost function is not critical to the result. For example, as Schmalensee [1983] 
originally assumed, even if the function is logarithmic, the qualitatively same equilibrium 
result of strategic entry deterrence can arise since the advertising best-response 
correspondence resembles the one I have derived above. 
5. Conclusions 
Schmalensee [1983] examined whether an incumbent can prevent a new firm's entry by 
engaging in informative advertising when the strategic variables at the post-advertising 
stage are quantities. Assuming that the two brands are sold at the same price because of the 
presence of perfectly informed consumers, he claimed that the post-advertising Cournot 
game always has pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Then, based on his claim, he showed that 
optimal entry deterrence always involves strategic precommitment to underinvestment in 
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informative advertising by the incumbent. 
This article reexamined his strategic entry-deterrence model via advertising. I have first 
shown that when the number of consumers knowing of only one brand is relatively greater 
than that of consumers knowing of only the other brand as a result of the advertising 
competition, mixed-strategy Cournot-Nash equilibria can arise. This disproves his 
characterization of the post-advertising Cournot-Nash equilibria, and invalidates his 
conclusion that optimal entry deterrence may involve advertising less than when entry 
threat is absent. Yet, I have shown that his conclusion remains qualitatively true even if the 
firms use the correct Coumot-Nash equilibrium strategies at the post-advertising stage. 
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Figure 3b. The Cournot-Nash Equilibria of the Post-advertising Game: Region B 
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Figure 5.The Regions in Which Firms Have Different Pure Strategies 
that Survive Iterated Strict Dominance: Region F 
Table 1. The Regions in Which the Firms Have Different Pure Strategies that Survive Iterat 
ed Strict Dominance: the Critical Mathematical Conditions. 
When (x, y) is in The Mathematical Conditions are Satisfied: 
Rl ( 1) x (1 - c) /2 :::; q~ and y(1 - c)/2 < q~; 
(2) q'J!. < qx(y(1 - c)/2) and q'./j < qy(x(1 - c)/2) 
R2t (1) x(1 - c)/2 2 q~ and y(1 - c)/2 < q~; 
(2) q'J!. < qx(y(1 - c)/2) and q'./j < qy(x(1 - c)/2). 
R3 ( 1) x (1 - c) /2 :::; q~ and y(1 - c}/2 :::; q~; 
(2) q'J!. < qx (y (1 - c) /2) and q'./j < qy(x(1 - c)/2). 
R4t ( 1) x (1 - c) /2 :::; q~ and y(1 - c)/2 < q~; 
(2) q'Jf. < qx [ qx (y (1 - c) /2) ] and qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)] :::; q'Jf. 
R5 (1) x(1 - c)/2 < q~ and y(1 - c)/2 < q~; 
(2) q'J!. < qy[qx(y(1 - c)/2)] and q'./j < qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)] 
R6t ( 1) x (1 - c) /2 < q~ and y(1 - c)/2 < q~; 
(2) q'J!. < qy[qx(y(1 - c)/2)] and q~ < qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)]. 
R7 (1) x(1 - c)/2 < q~(or qx) and y(1 - c)/2 < q~(or qy); 
(2) q'J!. < q;dqx (y(1 - c) /2)] and q'J!.(or <Ix) < qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)J. 
Rst (1) x(1 - c)/2 :::; q~(or qx) and y(1 - c)/2 < q~ 
(2) q'J!. :::; qy[qx(y(1 - c)/2)] and qx [qy(x(l - c) /2)] :::; q'J!. (or qx) 
R9 (1) x(1- c)/2 < qX and y(1 - c)/2 < qy; 
(2) qX < qx(qy[qx(y(1 - c)/2)]) and qy < q~,(qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)]). 
RIOt ( 1) x (1 - c) /2 :::; q~ and y(1 - c)/2 :::; q~ 
(2) qy :::; qx(qy[qx(y(1 - c)/2)]) and qy(qx[qy(x(1 - c)/2)]) :::; qX 
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Figure 6g. R7: (x, y) = (0.11, 0.09) 
Figure 6f. R6: (x, y) = (0.13, 0.1) 
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Figure 6h. R8: (x, y) = (0.15, 0.1) 
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Figure 6j. RIO: (x, y) = (0.06, 0.03) 







I 0.14: 4 0.1 0.16 
When (x, y) is in 
R 1, R2-1, (R2' -I), R3-1 
R2-2, R3-2, R3-3 
R3-2', (R2' -2), R3-3 
R3-3 
0.2 0.22 0.24 0.26 
The Carrier of the Mixed-strategy Equilibrium: 
{(Firm X's Carrier), (Firm Y's Carrier)} 
{(1, 2,3), (1,2, 3)} 
{(1, 3), (2, 3)} 
{(2, 3), (1, 3)} 
{(1, 3), (1, 3)} 
Note: When x and yare in R3-3, the post-advertising Coumot game has three mixed-strategy 
equilibria. 











When (x, y) is in 
R4, (R4'), RS, (RS'), R7-6 
R5, R6-1, (R6' -I), R7-1 
R6-2, R7-2, R7-3, 





0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 x 
The Carrier of the Mixed-strategy Equilibrium: 
{(Firm X's Carrier), (Firm Y's Carrier)} 
{(1, 2), (1, 2)} 
{(1, 3, 4), (1, 3, 4)} 
{(1, 3,4), (2,3, 4)} 
{(2, 3,4), (1, 3, 4)} 
{(2, 3,4), (2, 3, 4)} 
{(2, 3,4), (1, 2, 4)} 
{(1, 2,4), (2, 3, 4)} 
{(1, 2, 3,4), (1, 2, 3, 4)} 
Note: When x and yare in R7-2, or R7-6, the post-advertising Coumot game has three 
mixed-strategy equilibria. 
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Figure 8c. Magnified part Z of Figure 8b 
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